Ransomware Recovery — Clean-Room Restore
A reference architecture demonstrating our engineering approach — not a record of a specific deployed customer. No client names, figures or outcomes are attached.
01 Problem
Recovering from a ransomware event without reintroducing the payload, and without trusting a backup that the same attacker may have had access to.
02 Components
Isolated network segment for restores, immutable backup storage (Object Lock, compliance mode), forensic acquisition tooling, scanning infrastructure for restored systems before reconnection.
03 Traffic flow
Restored systems have no network path to production until scanned and cleared; the clean-room segment has no route back to the compromised environment.
04 Security
Immutability means the backup itself could not have been altered by an attacker holding domain admin credentials in production, since Object Lock prevents deletion or modification even by administrators.
05 Failure scenarios
If the immutable backup itself is unavailable or corrupted, replicated secondary copies in a second region provide a fallback — this is why replication precedes 'immutable storage' in the standard chain.
06 Recovery
Containment first, then forensic evidence preservation, then clean-room restore, then scanning before reconnection, then a written post-incident review.
07 Technology options
Backup platform can vary (Veeam, Restic/Rclone, cloud-native); the immutability guarantee (Object Lock in compliance mode) is the non-negotiable requirement, not the specific tool.
08 Trade-offs
Clean-room recovery takes longer than a direct restore to production — that time cost is the price of confidence that the payload doesn't come back with the data.